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THE LEGALITY OF RECIPROCITY IN THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM 
 Robbie Sabel* 
Modern international humanitarian law has no satisfactory solution 
to the dilemma posed by a regular army in combat with an irregular force 
that deliberately targets civilians. In the past, the laws of war allowed an 
army to attack enemy civilians as a reciprocal measure to an attack on its 
own civilians. Modern humanitarian law has attempted to outlaw such 
measures of reciprocity. The question is posed as to whether the attempt to 
outlaw such reciprocity has in fact contributed to the protection of civilians 
or perhaps has encouraged irregular forces to attack civilians. The article 
also presents the cruel and arbitrary nature of reciprocal attacks against 
civilians and suggests that a more humanitarian approach might be to per-
mit such action against the governmental organs controlling irregular 
forces. 
I.  RECIPROCITY IN THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM 
A troubling issue of law and morality is evoked by the question of 
reciprocity in an armed conflict where a regular army, complying with the 
laws of war, combats irregular fighters who deliberately attack civilians. 
This issue is compounded by the modern tendency to merge the laws of 
armed conflict with the international law of human rights. As a result of this 
merging, one finds that international organizations tend to automatically 
presume that any civilian death in an armed conflict is a violation of law. 
Where there are many civilian deaths the presumption of a violation of law 
tends to become a definite conclusion that there was such a violation. Civi-
lian deaths caused by irregular forces, however, are often excused by ex-
plaining that the irregular forces do not possess accurate weapons, and that 
because of their inferior force, they are not capable of combating armed 
forces. Hence, it is legitimate for them to attack the soft underbelly of their 
enemy, namely civilians. 
One of the much touted and admired aspects of international law of 
human rights is that it is void of any aspect of reciprocity. The norms of 
human rights are absolute norms; human beings are entitled to such rights 
by virtue of their humanity and not by virtue of reciprocity, nor by virtue of 
  
 *  Dr. Robbie Sabel is a visiting professor of international law at the Hebrew University in 
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state behavior, existence of an international element, and not even by virtue 
of State recognition of such rights. Human rights are seen by some as a ―se-
cular religion, something which is metaphysical and cannot be proved, but 
often taken on faith . . . .‖1 As a consequence of the blurring of the classical 
differentiation between these two branches of international law, the absence 
of the element of reciprocity has also increasingly become a modern feature 
of the laws of armed conflict. It is pertinent to question, however, whether 
the lofty principle of the absence of reciprocity has in fact contributed to the 
protection of civilians in armed conflict.2 
Democratic states are faced with the question as to what measures 
of enforcement can be legally applied against irregular forces deliberately 
targeting civilians, exploiting the fact that the regular army of a democratic 
state will be complying with the laws of war.3 There can be little utility in 
analyzing what rules of international law are applicable to such groups al-
though this issue is much debated in academic journals.4 The very raison 
d’être of armed groups using terror tactics is to achieve their political aims 
by means that flout norms of law and humanitarian behavior. It is highly 
unlikely that Osama Bin Laden or his colleagues consult legal textbooks on 
international law prior to engaging in their nefarious activities. There is no 
universally accepted definition of terrorism, however, the U.N. General 
Assembly has defined terrorism as ―criminal acts intended or calculated to 
provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particu-
lar persons for political purposes.‖5 The U.N. General Assembly further 
declared that such acts of terrorism ―are in any circumstance unjustifiable, 
whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, 
ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them.‖6 The 
international legal community has, over the years, created an impressive 
network of treaties that require states to prosecute or extradite persons who 
  
 1 DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 34 (2d ed. 2006). 
 2 See generally Andrew D. Mitchell, Does One Illegality Merit Another? The Law Of 
Belligerent Reprisals In International Law, 170 MIL. L. REV. 155 (2001) (arguing for en-
forcement mechanisms at the international level as an alternative to belligerent reprisals). 
 3 See Jefferson D. Reynolds, Collateral Damage on the 21st Century Battlefield, 56 A.F. 
L. REV. 1, 79 (2005) (―[A] state’s . . . compliance with [laws of armed conflict] is essential to 
the effective execution of an adversary's strategy to exploit it.‖); MARK OSIEL, THE END OF 
RECIPROCITY, TERROR, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF WAR 36 (Cambridge University Press 
2009) (―There may be a difference between ordinary armed conflicts, in which reciprocity 
enforces legal norms, and extraordinary wars, in which it cannot.‖). 
 4 Supra note 2, at 158 (noting the debate over applicability of the U.N. Charter to non-
belligerent reprisals). 
 5 G.A. Res. 51/210, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210 (Dec. 17, 1996). 
 6 Id.  
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have committed acts of terrorism.7 However, the reality is that there has 
been a dearth of actual prosecutions. The International Criminal Court by its 
nature can have only a very limited effect and the increasing reliance on the 
principle of universal jurisdiction seems to have been used mainly as a po-
litical tool to demonize Israel and the United States, rather than to prosecute 
individuals from groups that deliberately target civilians.8 The U.N. Securi-
ty Council has recognized that, in addition to criminal prosecutions, states 
have a right of self-defense against terrorism, a right that includes the use of 
armed force.9 At what point the right of self-defense kicks in would seem to 
be dependent on the scale and intensity of the hostilities.10  
On the assumption that a state is involved in armed conflict with an 
armed group that deliberately attacks civilians, the question then arises as to 
whether a state can take countermeasures that would otherwise be illegal in 
order to prevent further attacks against its civilians. It can be argued that the 
  
 7 See, e.g., Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-
craft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation,  Sept. 23, 1971, 24 
U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 178; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 
U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 
Dec. 17,1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the Physical Protection 
of Nuclear Material, Mar. 3, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11080, 1456 U.N.T.S. 125; Protocol on the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, 
Feb. 24, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 627, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474; Convention for the Suppression of Unlaw-
ful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 668, 1678 
U.N.T.S. 221; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed 
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 685, 1678 U.N.T.S. 
304;  Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1, 
1991, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-8 (1991), 30 I.L.M. 721; International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. No. 106-6 (1998), U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/52/164, 37 I.L.M. 249, 2149 U.N.T.S. 284; International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13075, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/54/109, 39 I.L.M. 270 (Full text of all these treaties available at   untrea-
ty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp.). 
 8 See  NGO Monitor, The NGO Front in the Gaza War: Lawfare Against Israel, Feb. 2, 
2009, http://www.ngomonitor.org/article/the_ngo_front_in_the_gaza_war_lawfare_against 
_israel (commenting on the exploit of universal jurisdiction by NGOs to politically demonize 
the United States and Israel). 
 9 See S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001) (recognizing the right to 
self defense while condemning the terrorist attacks of 9/11/01); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (reaffirming the right to self defense while deciding states 
should take steps necessary to prevent the financing of terrorism). 
 10 See Gregory E. Maggs, Assessing the Legality of Counterterrorism Measures Without 
Characterizing Them as Law Enforcement or Military Action 7 (George Washington Univer-
sity Law School Public Law Research Paper, Paper No. 257, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=965433##(noting that for a state’s  
response to qualify as self defense, an ―armed attack‖ must have occurred).  
File: Sabel 2 Created on:  11/28/2010 10:08:00 PM Last Printed: 4/5/2011 8:12:00 PM 
476 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 43:473 
laws of war are inadequate when they purport to deal with a situation when 
one party, which is a regular army, implements the laws of war and the oth-
er party, which is not a regular army, deliberately acts against the laws of 
war and bases its military tactics on the exploitation of the fact that the army 
facing it abides by these laws of war.11 International law, and in particular 
laws of armed conflict, have very limited means of enforcement and the 
desire for mutuality is one of the elements that motivate hostile parties to 
respect the laws of armed conflict. Countermeasures are a recognized act of 
enforcement in international law and the International Law Commission 
(―ILC‖) draft on the subject reads: 
The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an interna-
tional obligation towards another State is precluded if and to the extent 
that the act constitutes a countermeasure taken against the latter State.
12
 
The ILC commentary, however, explicitly points out that the reference is to 
―non-forcible measures‖ and, hence, clearly not applicable to armed repris-
als.13 Countermeasures in armed conflict, which are commonly referred to 
as ―reprisals‖ or ―belligerent reprisals‖ have been defined as: 
Acts of retaliation in the form of conduct which would otherwise be un-
lawful, resorted to by one belligerent against enemy personnel or property 
for acts of warfare committed by the other belligerent in violation of the 
laws of war, for the purpose of enforcing future compliance with the rec-
ognized rules of civilized warfare.
14
 
It has been argued that it was the fear of reprisals in kind that led to 
the Axis States refraining from using poison gas during the Second World 
War.15 The Third Geneva Convention, for example, obliges the release of all 
prisoners at the end of ―active hostilities.‖16 The language of the Convention 
does not authorize states to demand reciprocity as regards to releasing pris-
oners, yet common sense dictates reciprocity and indeed that is what hap-
pens in practice. The International Committee on the Red Cross (―ICRC‖) 
  
 11 See Reynolds, supra note 4; OSIEL,supra note 3, at 36. 
 12 Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internation-
ally Wrongful Acts, art. 22, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Aug. 2001). 
 13 Id. 
 14 U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL: THE 
LAW OF LAND WARFARE ¶ 497 (1956); See also Naulilaa (Por. v. Ger.), 8 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 
409, 422–25, reprinted in 2 R.I.A.A. 1011, 1026. 
 15 David A. Koplow, Long Arms and Chemical Arms: Extraterritoriality and the Draft 
Chemical Weapons Convention, 15 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 9 (1990) (discussing the chemical 
warfare weapons both Allied and Axis powers stockpiled but did not use out of fear of ―esca-
latory retaliation‖). 
 16 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 118, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
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has never, in practice, demanded from one state that it release prisoners 
except against a reciprocal release by the other party involved.  
Modern conventional law of armed conflict appears, however, in 
most circumstances, to reject the element of reciprocity. The 1977 Protocol 
I rule is that ―attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way of 
reprisals are prohibited.‖17 According to the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (―ICTY‖), ―the bulk of this body of law lays 
down absolute obligations, namely obligations that are unconditional or in 
other words not based on reciprocity.‖18 Yet, the outlawing of reprisals 
against civilians may not be as clear-cut as would appear. The right to ex-
ecute acts of reprisal—apart from a number of absolute prohibitions such as 
the murder of prisoners of war—has been recognized in the past and was the 
legal basis to the justification of the air bombardment by the Allies of Ger-
man cities during the Second World War.19 
The 1949 Geneva Convention did not reject reprisal actions against 
civilians in enemy territory and the rule in Protocol I is an innovation.20 
During the debate on the Article at the diplomatic conference that drafted 
the Protocol, some states expressed reservation as to the prohibition on acts 
of reprisal against civilian targets.21 The U.S.’ representative remarked, 
―[b]y denying the possibility of a response and not offering any workable 
substitute, the Protocol is unrealistic and, in that respect, cannot be expected 
to withstand the test of future armed conflict.‖22 It has been held by Bothe 
and others that this new rule did not reflect customary law at the time and 
they note that ―[e]xisting conventional law does not prohibit reprisals 
against enemy combatants and enemy civilians in territory controlled by the 
enemy.‖23 The British Government added a reservation when it ratified Pro-
tocol I, which stated that the United Kingdom retains the right to attack civi-
  
 17 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 51(6), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter First Protocol]. 
 18 Prosecutor v. Kuprekić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 517 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2001) (criminal tribunal commenting on humanitarian law). 
 19 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 2, July 27, 1929, 
47 Stat. 2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343 (―[Prisoners of war] shall at all times be humanely treated 
and protected, particularly against acts of violence . . . [and m]easures of reprisal against 
them are forbidden.). 
 20 See OSIEL, supra note 4, at 36 (―The 1949 treaties do not bar reprisal, for instance, 
against enemy civilians and civilian property unprotected by the Fourth convention . . . .‖). 
 21 See generally infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 22 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development 
of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 58th plen. mtg, (Vol. VII) 
U.N. Doc. CDDH/SR58, ¶ 81 at 294 (Geneva, 1974–1977). 
 23 MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICT 312 (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 1982). 
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lians or the enemy’s civilian targets in reprisal against such attacks against 
her, solely in order to force the enemy to cease from such attacks and after 
having warned the enemy and that the decision to carry out such an act of 
reprisal must be made at the highest levels.24 This reservation is reflected in 
the order found in the British Army Manual according to which states: ―[re-
prisals] may not be undertaken by UK armed forces without prior authoriza-
tion at the highest level of government,‖ thus clearly not rejecting the actual 
legality of acts of reprisal.25 Germany and Italy also added a statement, 
though not in the form of a reservation, that was similar to the British reser-
vation, but couched in vaguer terms. It states that they retain the right to 
respond to an attack on civilians with all the means allowed to them by in-
ternational law.26 At face value, the British reservation appears to be in con-
tradiction to the article’s wording, but no state sent an objection to the Swiss 
government regarding the British reservation. This silence is especially 
meaningful since during the diplomatic conference, a significant number of 
states expressed their opinion that the Article itself, regarding the defense of 
citizens, is so important that reservation with it should not be permitted.27 
The ICTY examined the legality of reprisal acts against civilians and even-
tually rejected the legality, but commented that ―[t]he protection of civilians 
  
 24 See Letter from Christopher Hulse, HM Ambassador of the United Kingdom, to the 
Swiss Government, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORM/0A9E03F0F2EE757CC 
1256402003FB6D2?OpenDocument (providing a correct copy of the letter dated 28 Jan. 
1998) [hereinafter UK Declaration to Geneva Protocol I]. 
 25 U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 65 (Oxford Univer-
sity Press 2004). 
 26 Declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany upon ratification of Protocol Addition-
al to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Reg. No. A-17512, Aug. 14, 1991, available at  
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORM/3F4D8706B6B7EA40C1256402003FB3C7?OpenDocum
ent (―The Federal Republic of Germany will react against serious and systematic violations 
of the obligations imposed by Additional Protocol I and in particular its Articles 51 and 52 
with all means admissible under international law in order to prevent any further violation.‖); 
Declaration of Italy upon ratification of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I), Reg. No. A-17512, Nov. 20, 1990, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/ 
NORM/E2F248CE54CF09B5C1256402003FB443?OpenDocument(―Italy will react to  
serious and systematic violations by an enemy of the obligations imposed by Additional 
Protocol I and in particular its Articles 51 and 52 with all means admissible under interna-
tional law in order to prevent any further violation.‖). 
 27 For a comprehensive analysis of the proceedings of the diplomatic conference see, e.g., 
BOTHE supra note 24, at 571–572; COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 
1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).  For 
a description of the work of the Conference, see, e.g., Charles L. Cantrell, Humanitarian Law 
in Armed Conflict: The Third Diplomatic Conference, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 253 (1977); R. R. 
Baxter, Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian Politics? The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on 
Humanitarian Law, 16 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (1975); David P. Forsythe, The 1974 Diplomatic 
Conference on Humanitarian Law: Some Observations, 69 AM. J. INT’L L. 77 (1975). 
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and civilian objects provided by modern international law may cease entire-
ly or be reduced or suspended in three exceptional circumstances: (i) . . . , 
(ii) . . . , and (iii) at least according to some authorities, when civilians may 
legitimately be the object of reprisals.‖28 The Tribunal added ―that at any 
rate, even when considered lawful, reprisals are restricted.‖29 The Tribunal 
preceded to gives details of the conditions for permitting acts of reprisal.30 It 
becomes clear that the innovative prohibition against acts of reprisal is not 
considered a rule of jus cogens
 
and the rule is not considered by some as 
representing customary law.31 The ICRC study on the customary law of war 
does not contend that the rule prohibiting reprisals has solidified into cus-
tom, but rather refers to ―[t]he trend towards outlawing reprisals.‖32 In-
ternational legal scholar Yoram Dinstein argues that:  
If Contracting State A commits atrocities against the civilian population of 
Contracting State B, the latter is not allowed to retaliate in kind against the 
civilian population of State A. But what do the framers of the Protocol ex-
pect State B to do? Turn the other cheek? That is a religious tenet rather 
than a serious military or political proposition. Since the Protocol does not 
provide State B with any practical alternative response, what is likely to 
happen is that Article 51, para. 6 will remain a dead letter and—
notwithstanding the paragraphs’s lucid language—State B will resort to 
belligerent reprisals against the civilians of State A.
33
  
However, cogent arguments can be made against allowing reprisals. 
A reprisal means deliberately killing civilians not participating in combat in 
order to pressure terrorists, in other words, a form of collective punish-
  
 28 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 522 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000), http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/6/ 
117.html. 
 29 Id. ¶ 535. 
 30 Id. 
 31 OSIEL, supra note 4, at 55–56; Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian 
Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 239, 250 (2000); THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS, NWP-1-14M, para. 6.2.3.3 (1995), available at http://www.lawofwar.org/naval 
_warfare_publication_N-114M.htm(last visited Sept. 30, 2010) (―The President alone may 
authorize the taking of a reprisal action by U.S. Forces.‖). 
 32 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, RULE 145 REPRISALS 
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1-rul-rule145 (last visited Sept. 30, 
2010) (the online version of the ICRC Study on customary international humanitarian law, 
conducted by the ICRC and published by Cambridge University Press in 2005).   
 33 Yoram Dinstein, Comments on Protocol I, 320 INT’L REV. RED. CROSS 515 (1997), 
available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JNV5 (last visited Sept. 30, 
2010). 
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ment.34 Frits Kalshoven points out their ―dubious efficacy.‖ Terrorist organ-
izations may well be callously indifferent to their own civilian losses and 
indeed welcome such losses as part of their ―lawfare‖ against democratic 
societies.
 35 Furthermore, the ICRC recalls that ―on the pretext that their 
own population had been hit by attacks carried out by the adversary, [the 
Second World War belligerents] went so far, by way of reprisals, as to wage 
war almost indiscriminately, and this resulted in countless civilian vic-
tims.‖36 Allowing reprisals against civilians clearly can be a slippery slope, 
reducing the arguments about legality to ―who started it?‖ 
Another avenue that may be less dangerous is to interpret ―civi-
lians‖ and ―civilian targets‖ in a narrower sense than is currently adopted by 
the ICRC. The destruction of governing executive or financial institutions is 
likely to provide a distinct military advantage to the attacking party. Clearly, 
we are not referring to obviously civilian institutions such as health, wel-
fare, or justice institutions. Ingrid Detter writes that ―[i]t is questionable 
whether government buildings are excluded under any clear rule of law 
from enemy attack.‖37 The ICRC also recognizes that a factory that produc-
es for the civilian market can provide support for a military effort, and 
therefore, there is a military achievement to be gained by its destruction.38  
In a draft version presented to the diplomatic conference that drew 
up the 1977 Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Convention, the ICRC suggested 
defining civilian targets as including facilities and means of transport that 
were planned for the civilian population, ―except if they are used mainly in 
support of the military effort.‖39 The ICRC definition did not relate to gov-
ernment institutions.40 The ICRC draft was not accepted and the version that 
was accepted stated, in the negative, that a civilian target is not a military 
  
 34 THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 32, para. 6.2.3; 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1417 (9th ed. 2009) (―The use of force, short of war, 
against another country to redress an injury caused by that country.‖). 
 35 FRITS KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS 26 (1971).  
 36 First Protocol, supra note 17, at 626 para. 1982.  
 37 INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 294 (2nd  ed. 2000). 
 38 First Protocol, supra note 17, art. 43 (―Other establishments or buildings which are 
dedicated to the production of civilian goods may also be used for the benefit of the army. In 
this case the object has a dual function and is of value for the civilian population, but also for 
the military. In such situations the time and place of the attack should be taken into consider-
ation, together with, on the one hand, the military advantage anticipated, and on the other 
hand, the loss of human life which must expected among the civilian population and the 
damage which would be caused to civilian objects‖). 
 39 Id. art. 47(2). 
 40 See id. art. 47(2) (―Consequently, objects designed for civilian use, such as houses, 
dwellings, installations and means of transport, and all objects which are not military objec-
tives, shall not be made the object of attack, except if they are used mainly in support of the 
military effort.‖). 
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target.41 Protocol I states, ―[i]n case of doubt whether an object which is 
normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house 
or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribu-
tion to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.‖42 The list of 
civilian objects that possess civilian status does not include broadcasting 
stations, means of transport, or government institutions. 43 An indirect defi-
nition of permitted targets appears in the 1954 Hague Convention, concern-
ing the protection of cultural places, that notes that cultural treasures may 
not be stored near ―industrial centers, an aerodrome, broadcasting station, 
establishment engaged upon work of national defense, a port or railway 
station of relative importance or a main line of communication.‖44 It could 
be well argued that such objects are legitimate targets, and even if not, they 
would be legitimate objects for reprisals, thus making a distinction between 
reprisals against semi-civilian governing bodies and reprisals against civi-
lians and indisputably civilian objects. 
II.  CONCLUSION 
Democratic societies need to find a way to deter terrorist forces 
from attacking civilians, yet to do so not by adopting the tactics of the ter-
rorists themselves. The rarely applied possibility of post factum criminal 
prosecution has not proved itself sufficient a deterrent. Within armed con-
flict between regular forces reciprocity, using reprisals against civilians, 
was, in the past, accepted as legal under customary law. Such reciprocity 
entails applying collective punishment to innocent civilians, it is liable to 
abuse and is often not effective.  
Another avenue could be to exclude executive bodies from the defi-
nition of civilians, thus allowing them to be legitimate targets and certainly 
  
 41 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 52(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3.   
 42 Id. art. 52(3). 
 43 See id. arts. 53–56 (limiting protection of civilian objects to cultural objects and places 
of worship; objects related to survival, such as foodstuffs and granaries; the natural environ-
ment; and dangerous power supply installations, such as dams and nuclear power plants). 
 44 See Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 
art. 8(1), May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 (―There may be placed under special protection a 
limited number of refuges intended to shelter movable cultural property in the event of armed 
conflict, of centres containing monuments and other immovable cultural property of very 
great importance, provided that they (a) are situated at an adequate distance from any large 
industrial centre or from any important military objective constituting a vulnerable point, 
such as, for example, an aerodrome, broadcasting station, establishment engaged upon work 
of national defence, a port or railway station of relative importance or a main line of com-
munication; (b) are not used for military purposes.‖ (emphasis added)). 
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legitimate objects for reprisals aimed at deterring terrorist attacks against 
civilians. 
 
